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INTRODUCTION 
Every morning, billions of people wake up in the developing world 
with rising uncertainty about the day ahead.  Food, water, shelter, and 
safety—none of it is certain.  And yet, nearly everyone reading this 
Comment rises each morning with thoughts of a run, a podcast, or a 
pour-over coffee.  Fortunately, international organizations have 
answered the uncertainty by financing trillions of dollars of projects in 
the developing world, all of which provide countless benefits to the 
most vulnerable people.  Although the international community has 
taken great strides in helping the developing world, significant work 
remains to alleviate poverty, child hunger, disease, and many other 
critical issues.  Still, when development projects occasionally cause 
harm, either intentionally or accidentally, those same destitute 
populations are left with the bill. 
International organizations enjoy unprecedented privileges and 
immunities which shield them from the neediest individuals.  This 
Comment examines the failed immunity and internal accountability 
regime of international organizations.  By highlighting the unique 
characteristics of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, this 
Comment proposes wholesale changes to organizational accountability. 
For generations, men like Budah Jam have supported their families 
by seasonally fishing near the Tragadi harbor off the Kutch coast of 
India.1  Fishing is a family business in the Kutch coast.2  While men in 
the village catch the fish, women in the village clean, dry, and prepare 
the fish for market.3  Villages like Budah’s are severely impoverished; 
seasonal fishing is their livelihood.4 
In 2008, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) loaned $450 
million to an Indian company for the construction of a coal-fired power 
plant in Gujarat.5  The IFC is an international organization that finances 
private-sector development projects under the umbrella of the World 
 
1. Complaint at 6-7, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612 (D.D.C Apr. 4, 
2015), ECF 1. 
2. Id. at 7. 
3. Id. at 6-7. 
4. Id.  
5. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2019).  
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Bank.6  Unfortunately, as the IFC concedes, the plant caused tragic 
environmental damage to Budah’s village, including the discharge of 
thermal pollution into the sea, extensive coal-dust exposure, and 
degradation of freshwater sources.7  As Budah and others in his village 
stated, the environmental damage affected the “life and existence” of 
over 10,000 fishermen and their families in the region.8  By all 
accounts, the impact was immediate and swift.9 
Beginning in the early 1990s, after increased pressure from various 
advocacy and sustainable development groups, international 
organizations began establishing internal accountability mechanisms, 
hoping to allay the international community’s concerns.10  In 1999, the 
IFC followed suit and established the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman 
(CAO).11  CAO’s mission is to “serve as a fair, trusted, and effective 
 
6. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, art. I, Dec. 
5, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620.  
7. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
8. Complaint, Association for the Struggle for Fishworkers’ Rights (MASS) Tata 
Mundra Power Plant, 4, India/Tata Ultra Mega-01/Mundra and Anjar (June 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter MASS Complaint], http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-
links/documents/TataMundraCAOComplaint_June112011.pdf. 
9. See generally EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, FACT SHEET: DESTRUCTIVE TATA 
MUNDRA COAL FIRED POWER PLANT [hereinafter FACT SHEET: TATA MUNDRA], 
https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/tata_mundra_factsheet-1.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2019). 
10. Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complaints and International Organizations: A 
Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International 
Financial Institutions, 36 GEO J. INT’L L. 403, 408-09 (2005) (“The change [in 
accountability] was happening because of developments in human rights law and 
changing views about the environmental and social responsibilities of key decision-
makers and actors. The result was that those who were adversely affected by the 
projects began to advocate more vigorously that all decision-makers, including 
funding sources, be held accountable for their decisions relating to these projects.”); 
see, e.g., Richard E. Bissell & Suresh Nanwani, Multilateral Development Bank 
Accountability Mechanisms: Developments and Challenges, 6 MANCHESTER J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 2, 6 (2009) (in 1993, as a result of pressure from NGOs, the World Bank 
established the World Bank Inspection Panel). 
11. Benjamin M. Saper, The International Finance Corporation’s Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO): An Examination of Accountability and Effectiveness 
from a Global Administrative Law Perspective, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1279, 
1288 (2012). 
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independent recourse and accountability mechanism, and to improve 
the environmental and social performance of the [IFC] . . . .”12 
Following the environmental carnage caused by the plant, Budah 
and others in his community filed a complaint with the CAO, seeking 
relief for the devastation to their environment and livelihood.13  In 2013, 
the CAO completed its investigation and issued a final audit report, 
finding that the IFC: (a) failed to comply with environmental and social 
impact standards, (b) failed to take reasonable steps to protect the local 
community, and (c) failed even in the face of explicit knowledge of the 
harms the plant would likely cause.14  The report also included 
extensive recommendations for remedies that would bring the IFC into 
compliance with its own standards.15  Two years later, in 2015, the 
CAO issued a monitoring report explaining that the IFC largely ignored 
its earlier findings and that the IFC had yet to remedy the issues caused 
by the plant.16  Despite the CAO’s report finding that the IFC failed to 
comply with environmental standards or take reasonable steps to 
protect the local community, the IFC rendered no monetary relief and 
left claimants like Budah with nothing.17 
After the CAO left Budah empty-handed, he and others sought to 
hold the IFC accountable in United States (U.S.) federal court by filing 
a complaint alleging various tort claims.18  Unfortunately, as explained 
below, Budah’s efforts were stonewalled by an immunity and 
accountability scheme with serious, damaging flaws.  Instead of leaving 
 
12. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, OPERATIONAL 
GUIDELINES 2 (2013) [hereinafter CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES], www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/documentsCAOoperationalGuidelines_2013.pdf. 
13. See generally MASS Complaint, supra note 8.  
14. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, CAO 
AUDIT REPORT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN COASTAL GUJARAT POWER LIMITED, INDIA 
(2013), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-
links/documents/CAOAuditReportC-I-R6-Y12-F160.pdf.  
15. See id. at 40 (explaining that the IFC conducted audits of the project and 
worked to bring client back into compliance with its obligations). 
16. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, MONITORING OF 
IFC’S RESPONSE TO: CAO AUDIT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN COASTAL GUJARAT POWER 
LIMITED, INDIA 3-5 (2015), http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/document-
links/documents/CGPLmonitoringreportJanuary2015.pdf.  
17. Complaint Jam, supra note 1, at 51-53. 
18. See generally id. Budah’s complaint alleged claims of negligence, trespass, 
nuisance, and breach of contract. Id. at 67-80. 
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claimants in the dark, the international community should look to one 
prior settlement scheme that successfully navigated a complex and 
difficult issue: the Tobacco Master Settlement. 
In 1998, following years of litigation, forty-six U.S. states entered 
into a $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with tobacco 
companies.19  The MSA paved the way for legislation that would 
require tobacco companies to deposit certain funds in escrow to secure 
payments for future claims.20  This Comment proposes that the 
international community should consider revising its failing 
accountability regime by adopting certain characteristics of the MSA.  
Specifically, international organizations, subject to certain parameters, 
should (a) ensure that a pool of funds is available for claimants suffering 
the most extreme, devastating injuries; and (b) create an independent, 
binding claims tribunal to hear complaints brought by injured parties.  
Instead of drowning claimants in an accountability gap, international 
organizations should use their large endowments to right the wrongs 
they cause. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and purpose of 
international organizations.  Part II explores international 
organizations’ immunities, both under international and U.S. law.  
Part III examines the CAO’s formation, structure, weaknesses, and 
various proposals for improvement.  Part IV analyzes the MSA, 
including the establishment of escrow statutes.  Finally, Part V proposes 
a compensation scheme that international organizations can follow, 
which is modeled after the MSA. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
A.  History of International Organizations 
In 1919, following the First World War, the League of Nations was 
established as the modern era’s first significant international 
 
19. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 
2007). Payments were to be made over a twenty-five-year period. Id. 
20. Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the Public 
Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 159, 
171 (2011). 
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organization.21  As a general matter, international organizations are 
“perhaps the most obvious and typical vehicles for interstate co-
operation.”22  International organizations have various sizes, goals, and 
structures.23 
While defining international organizations is a surprisingly difficult 
and complex task,24 organizations share several foundational features.25  
First, international organizations are comprised of member-states that 
wield decision-making authority based on their proportionate share of 
capital contributions to the organization.26  Second, international 
organizations operate under charters that specify the duties of their 
member-states and, critical to the discussion of this Comment, lay out 
“certain privileges and immunities of the institutions and their staff 
members.”27  Multi-lateral Development Banks are international 
organizations that provide loans to finance economic development 
projects.28  Multi-lateral Development Banks, like the IFC, inevitably 
fund projects that result in harm, such as the environmental harm caused 
to Budah’s village.  This Comment discusses the difficulty in holding 
international organizations accountable based on their wide-ranging 
privileges and immunities. 
The evolution of Multi-lateral Development Banks (MDBs) can be 
traced to three distinct generations.29  The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) marked the first generation.30  
The IBRD was formed to spur economic development outside of 
 
21. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 19 (2002). 
22. Id. at 28. 
23. See id. at 23. 
24. See generally id. at 7-13 (explaining that the varying definitions of 
international law lead to a lack of consensus about whether international organizations 
are subject to customary international law). 
25. John W. Head, For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Directed 
at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 249 (2004). It is 
important to note that although this Comment mainly deals with MDBs, which are a 
type of international organization, these shared characteristics should not be strictly 
construed as only applying to MDBs.  
26. Id.  
27. Id. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. at 250.  
30. Id.  
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Europe following the devastation of the Second World War.31  In 1960, 
the International Development Association (IDA) marked the second 
generation.32  The IDA was formed to provide loans to less developed 
countries, mainly those that were granted independence through 
decolonization.33  The IBRD and IDA merged, forming the World 
Bank.34  Finally, in 1990, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) marked the third generation.35  The EBRD was 
formed to assist various countries in transitioning from Communist to 
Democratic political control.36 
B.  Purpose of International Organizations 
International organizations, specifically MDBs, generally have a 
central focus: economic development.37  To achieve this goal, the 
organizations “provide loans (and some grants) to finance economic 
development projects such as roads, irrigation systems, port facilities, 
power plants, rural health facilities, teacher training, fertilizer 
production, agricultural credit, and institutional strengthening.”38 
Not surprisingly, such a wide array of projects occasionally results 
in devastating injuries to local populations.39  Additionally, as these 
projects are only conducted in the developing world, local populations 




33. Id.  
34. Id. at 248.  
35. Id. at 251. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 249. 
38. Id. 
39. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2019, https://cao-ar19.org/CAO-Annual-Report-2019.pdf. In 2018, 
the CAO handled sixty new cases of claimants seeking review; however, only twelve 
of those have been deemed eligible, with the others under further 
investigation. Id. at 2.  
40. Richard A. Gosselin et al., Injuries: The Neglected Burden in Developing 
Countries, 87 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 246, 246 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672580/pdf/08-052290.pdf (“More 
than 90% of injury deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, where 
preventive efforts are often nonexistent, and health-care systems are least prepared to 
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magnitude and probability of causing injuries to vulnerable 
populations, international organizations largely enjoy wide immunity 
from suit.41 
II.  IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
A.  Methods of Receiving Immunity 
Immunities are conferred on an international organization in 
several ways.42  First, the governing charter or treaty establishing the 
international organization may include an express immunity provision, 
as in the case of the United Nations.43  Second, international 
organizations can enter into separate multilateral treaties that establish 
privileges and immunities.44  Third, as discussed below, member states 
may pass legislation conferring immunity on specific international 
organizations, similar to the immunity conferred on the IFC by the U.S. 
Congress through the International Organizations Immunities Act 
(IOIA).45 
International organizations, even in their earliest forms, always 
enjoyed certain privileges and immunities, which “enabl[ed] them to 
carry out their tasks in an independent fashion. This functional 
necessity rationale for a preferential treatment . . . has long dominated 
the debate and has rarely been questioned by the courts or other 
decision-makers.”46  The functional necessity doctrine is so widely 
accepted that the American Law Institute included it in the Restatement 
 
meet the challenge. As such, injuries clearly contribute to the vicious cycle of poverty 
and the economic and social costs have an impact on individuals, communities and 
societies.”). 
41. See, e.g., International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) 
(2002).  
42. August Reinisch, Privileges and Immunities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 132, 135 (Jan Klabbers & Asa 
Wallendahl eds., 2011).  
43. Id.   
44. Id. For example, the Council of Europe and Organization of American States 
has passed separate agreements detailing certain privileges and immunities for its 
international organizations. Id.  
45. See id. at 132-33; see also International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 
U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002). 
46. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 132.  
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Third of Foreign Relations Law.47  Essentially, most scholars agree that 
international organizations should be given enough immunity as 
necessary to carry out their missions.48 
B.  Organizational Immunity under U.S. Law  
and Effects of Jam v. IFC 
Toward the end of the Second World War, the United States and its 
allies decided that international organizations would be vital for 
rebuilding the world’s devastated economic and social framework.49  
To this end, in 1945, Congress passed the IOIA, which provided 
international organizations the same immunity from suit as enjoyed by 
foreign governments.50  At the time, foreign governments enjoyed 
virtually absolute immunity from suit.51  In 1976, Congress passed the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides several 
exceptions to foreign government immunity, including an exception for 
when the foreign government’s conduct is based on commercial activity 
that has a specific connection to the United States.52 
 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 467(1) (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1987) (“[U]nder international law, an international organization generally 
enjoys such privileges and immunities from the jurisdiction of a member state as are 
necessary for the fulfilment of the purposes of the organization, including immunity 
from legal process, and from financial controls, taxes, and duties.”). The American 
Law Institute is the United States’ leading legal organization that prepares “scholarly 
work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.” About ALI, AM. LAW. 
INST, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). The American Law 
Institute also provides the Restatement of the Law, which clarifies the law for courts, 
legislatures, and attorneys. Id.  
48. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 134. This is known as the functional necessity 
rationale. Id.  
49. Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the 
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 487-88 
(2008). 
50. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002) 
(“International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial 
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such 
organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings 
or by the terms of any contract.”). 
51. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 765 (2019). 
52. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (“A 
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States 
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Budah’s attempt to hold the IFC accountable in U.S. federal court 
eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United States.53  The 
Court considered whether the IOIA forever crystallized the virtually 
absolute immunity enjoyed at the time of its passing, or, whether the 
FSIA also restricted, by reference, the immunity of international 
organizations.54  The Jam Court held that the FSIA provided 
international organizations with the same immunity provided to foreign 
governments at the time of the lawsuit; accordingly, the IFC was less 
immune from suit than it was in 1945 when the IOIA was passed.55  The 
Court rested its decision on the fact that the most natural interpretation 
of the IOIA, under the reference canon of statutory interpretation, is that 
the act forever linked the immunity of international organizations with 
that of foreign governments.56  The majority of the Court rejected the 
IFC’s argument that restricting immunity in this case would open up 
 
or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property 
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 
in the United States.”). 
53. See generally Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759-60 (explaining the procedural history 
of the case). 
54. Id. at 765 (“This case requires us to determine whether the IOIA grants 
international organizations the virtually absolute immunity foreign governments 
enjoyed when the IOIA was enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy 
today.”). 
55. Id. at 772 (“The International Organizations Immunities Act grants 
international organizations the ‘same immunity’ from suit ‘as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments’ at any given time. Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act governs the immunity of international organizations. The 
International Finance Corporation is therefore not absolutely immune from suit.”). In 
1945, foreign governments enjoyed “virtually absolute immunity as a matter of 
international grace and comity,” because the U.S. State Department adhered to the 
“classical theory of foreign sovereign immunity.” Id. at 765-66. 
56. Id. at 769 (“The same logic applies here. The IOIA’s reference to the 
immunity enjoyed by foreign governments is a general rather than specific reference. 
The reference is to an external body of potentially evolving law—the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity—not to a specific provision of another statute. The IOIA should 
therefore be understood to link the law of international organization immunity to the 
law of foreign sovereign immunity, so that the one develops in tandem with the 
other.”).   
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the floodgates to a flood of litigation against international 
organizations, thereby defeating the initial purpose of immunity.57  
Critically, although the Court sided with Budah and remanded the case 
for further proceedings,58 the District Court found the IFC immune 
from suit because none of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions applied.59 
Officials of many international organizations often claim, as the 
IFC did in Jam, that social safeguard policies increase costs and impede 
lending.60  However, the IFC has experienced steady growth since the 
establishment of its internal accountability mechanism, the CAO.61  
Specifically, in the past decade alone, the IFC’s commitments have 
nearly tripled.62  Further, while restricting immunity may lead to more 
 
57. Id. at 772. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion largely agreeing with 
the IFC’s contention that restricting immunity would lead to a flood of litigation 
against international organizations. See id. at 772-87 (Breyer, J. dissenting). However, 
numerous facts suggest that restricting organizational immunity would neither have a 
chilling effect on the organizations nor open the floodgates to waves of litigation. See 
generally Brief of Amicus Curiae of Dr. Erica R. Gould in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants and Reversal, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 
15-cv-00612) [hereinafter Gould Brief] (arguing that institutional factors and prior 
history disprove the IFC’s contention that restrictive immunity would inhibit the 
organization’s mission and lead to significant litigation). 
58. Once Budah’s case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia, the IFC filed a renewed motion to dismiss. See generally Motion to 
Dismiss, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612, (D.D.C June 19, 2019), ECF 40. 
59. The FSIA provides several exceptions to immunity, including when the 
conduct in question was based on commercial activity with a sufficient nexus to the 
United States. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012). On 
remand, the District Court found that the commercial activity exception, the only 
exception applicable to Budah’s case, did not apply “because the suit is not, as its 
core, based upon activity—commercial or otherwise—carried on or performed in the 
United States.” Memorandum Opinion, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-00612, 
(D.D.C Feb. 14, 2020), ECF 61.  
60. See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771-72.  
61. See OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, IFC ANNUAL 
REPORT 2015 113 (2015) (“IFC’s total resources available consist of paid-in capital, 
retained earnings net of designations and certain unrealized gains, and total loan-loss 
reserves. The excess available capital, beyond what is required to support existing 
business, allows for future growth of our portfolio while also providing a buffer 
against unexpected external shocks. As of June 30, 2015, total resources available 
reached $22.6 billion, while the minimum capital requirement totaled $19.2 billion.”). 
62. Id. at 76 (“In FY15, we invested nearly $4.7 billion in the 78 poorest 
countries — those eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s International 
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litigation, the number of complaints lodged with the CAO is minimal 
to begin with.  According to the IFC, the organization received 
complaints for only two percent of the projects funded in 2015.63  With 
so few complaints, it is unlikely that restricting immunity would lead to 
prohibitively costly litigation. 
While greater accountability is needed, international organizations 
cannot adequately fulfill their vital missions without certain privileges 
and immunities.64  In fact, it is well-accepted that some immunity is 
critical for international organizations to succeed.65  As a general 
matter, absent certain rare statutory exceptions, international 
organizations are largely immune from suit in U.S. courts.66  Therefore, 
holding international organizations accountable is a complicated 
endeavor.67  International organizations may be held accountable to 
their member states, other nations, and contracting parties; however, 
non-state actors, like Budah, have frequently been placed in the 
“accountability gap.”68  Fortunately, international law, unlike U.S. law, 
provides compelling arguments and precedent for ensuring access to 
real, effective remedies.69 
 
Development Association, or IDA. Our long-term investments in those countries have 
more than tripled over the past decade.”). 
63. Gould Brief, supra note 57, at 22; Katie Redford, “We Are Above the Law” 
— World Bank Asks Supreme Court for Absolute Immunity, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L 
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://earthrights.org/blog/we-are-above-the-law-world-bank-asks-
supreme-court-for-absolute-immunity/. 
64. Reinisch, supra note 42, at 573. 
65. Id.  
66. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2002); 
see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012) (outlining 
exceptions to the general immunity that foreign governments and international 
organizations enjoy). 
67. See generally Bradlow, supra note 10, at 405-06 (discussing that 
international organizations are usually only accountable to a limited pool of actors).  
68. Id. at 405-06 (explaining that this gap is created because there are usually 
no contractual relationships between international organizations and non-state actors); 
see generally Reinisch, supra note 42, at 573 (discussing the increased awareness of 
accountability gaps and the need for limited immunity).  
69. See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A 
Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2292 (1991) (discussing the procedure of how 
international claims used to be brought and resolved). 
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C.  Organizational Immunity under International Law 
Traditionally, non-state actors struggled to hold international 
organizations accountable under international law, which was itself 
concerned only with the “rights and remedies of states” in their 
interactions with each other.70  International law considered only state 
interests, not individual interests.71  As individuals were not subjects of 
international law, claimants were required to first exhaust available 
domestic remedies before persuading their own state to commence 
diplomatic international efforts on their behalf.72 
However, the aftermath of the Second World War prompted a 
remarkable shift in previously state-centered notions of international 
law.73  Following the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals, 
international law began recognizing individual rights and official 
responsibility.74  Both tribunals “pierced the veil of state sovereignty 
and dispelled the myth that international law is for states only . . . . 
Thereafter, private citizens, government officials, nongovernmental 
organizations and multinational enterprises could all be rightsholders 
and responsible actors under international law.”75 
Under this modern approach, international organizations, as 
subjects of international law, are bound by the rules of customary 
international law.76  Additionally, customary international law requires 
that international organizations provide injured non-state actors with 
 
70. See id.  
71. See id. 
72. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1964).  
73. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 
2347, 2358-89 (1991). 
74. Id.  
75. Id. (emphasis added).  
76. Daniel D. Bradlow, Using a Shield as a Sword: Are International 
Organizations Abusing Their Immunity, 31 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 45, 59 (2017); 
see Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-91 (Dec. 20, 1980) (“International organizations 
are subjects of international law, and as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent 
upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under 
international agreements to which they are parties.”).  
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access to real, effective remedies for their injuries.77  The right to a 
remedy is not a novel concept of international law.78 
Over ninety years ago, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice79 decided the Factory at Chorzow case, a cornerstone case in 
the development of international reparations. The court held that “it is 
a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, 
that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation.”80 
Beginning in 1947, the United Nations expressly sought to diminish 
the “accountability gap” by requiring otherwise immune organizations 
to provide appropriate modes of settlement for disputes with non-state 
actors.81  In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
specifically stated that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective 
remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him.”82 
In 1976, the international community accepted the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which provides that “any person 
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have 
an [e]ffective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”83  Further, the 
covenant provides that those claimants “shall have [their] right[s] . . . 
 
77. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
182 (1999). 
78. Id.  
79. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was an international 
court attached to the League of Nations.  The PCIJ disbanded in 1946. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice, INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/history 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).   
80. Factory at Chorzow, Judgment (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 
¶ 73 (Sept. 13, 1928) (emphasis added); see generally Brief of International Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari at 16, Jam v. Int’l 
Fin. Corp. (No 17-1011) (discussing the foundational principle derived from Factory 
of Chorzow that makes international organizations subjects of international law). 
81. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 
art. IX, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 521 (“Each specialized agency shall make 
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of . . . [d]isputes arising out of contracts 
or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party . . . .”).  
82. G.A. Res 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8 (Dec. 
10, 1948).  
83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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determined by competent judicial, administrative . . . authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the 
State.”84 
A majority of the international community has signed and ratified 
treaties holding that international law requires providing an effective 
remedy for relief.85  As a subject of international law, the IFC and other 
international organizations must provide injured, non-state actors with 
access to real remedies.  Unfortunately for Budah and others affected 
by IFC funded projects, the IFC’s international accountability 
mechanism, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, fails to provide real, 
effective remedies, despite customary international law. 
III.  THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN 
A.  Establishment of the CAO 
The World Bank is comprised of the IFC, International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, International Development 
Association, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.86  The 
United States is the largest donor to the IFC, contributing nearly one 
quarter of the organization’s capital.87  The IFC is one of the two bodies 
of the World Bank that finances private-sector projects in the 
developing world.88  In 1999, the CAO was established to advise IFC 
management on compliance with the organization’s social and 
 
84. Id.  
85. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Daniel Bradlow in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 13-14, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
cv-00612) [hereinafter Bradlow Brief] (describing how the following international 
treaties include right to remedy principles: International Convention on Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; American Convention on Human Rights; 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Arab Charter on Human Rights; 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action). 
86. Saper, supra note 11, at 1282.  
87. Id. at 1283 n.10 (citing Susan Park, Becoming Green: Diffusing Sustainable 
Development Norms Throughout the World Bank Group, in THE WORLD BANK AND 
GOVERNANCE: A DECADE OF REFORM AND REACTION 168, 173 (Diane Stone & 
Christopher Wright eds., 2007). 
88. Id. at 1283. The other body of the World Bank that does such work is the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Id. 
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environmental policies.89  Some believe the IFC formed the CAO in 
response to the increasing pressure from advocacy groups, the IFC’s 
own board of directors, and the inadequate internal investigation of a 
prior damaging project in Chile.90 
B.  The CAO’s Roles and Procedures 
The CAO is governed by its operational guidelines.91  It has three 
separate, distinct roles: (1) the compliance branch audits projects to 
ensure compliance with IFC social and environmental policies, (2) the 
advisory branch advises management concerning certain projects, and 
(3) the ombudsman branch responds to complaints and attempts to 
resolve issues.92  The ombudsman is the only branch that allows private 
citizens to file complaints alleging social or environmental damages 
caused by IFC funded projects.93 
CAO complaints are first screened for eligibility before a full 
assessment is conducted of the issues.94  Subsequently, the parties have 
an opportunity to agree to a joint resolution or seek a compliance 
appraisal.95  If the parties reach an agreement, the CAO assists in 
monitoring to ensure the terms of the agreement are fulfilled.96 
 
89. Id. at 1290. In the 1990s, the IFC financed the Pangue Hydroelectric dam 
project in Chile. The project displaced and impacted several indigenous communities. 
According to the IFC, “no other project in the history of the IFC has led to such 
ongoing controversy, and far-reaching institutional change.” INT’L FIN. CORP., 
LESSONS LEARNED; PANGUE HYDROELECTRIC, 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6a808313-bf7a-4d36-b49f-
eaf5ea4bfc6d/pangue_summary.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKS
PACE-6a808313-bf7a-4d36-b49f-eaf5ea4bfc6d-jqeEQqr (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
90. Bissell & Nanwani, supra note 10, at 15.   
91. See generally CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §1.1 (“To 
carry out its mandate, it is essential that CAO be able to work in a flexible manner 
and retain its discretion. While these Guidelines provide a procedural framework to 
inform CAO, the complainant, and those engaged in a CAO process, they are not 
intended to unduly restrict CAO.”).  
92. Bissell & Nanwani, supra note 10, at 15-16. 
93. Id. at 16.  
94. CAO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §2.4. This preliminary step 
takes around 15 working days. Id.  
95. Id. 
96. Id. §3.2.3 (“This may be achieved by setting mutually agreed timelines and 
outcome indicators within the body of the agreement.”). 
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C.  Lack of Independence, Fairness, and Binding Authority 
Most international organizations view their internal accountability 
mechanisms as tools for improving operational effectiveness, rather 
than providing effective remedies to injured parties.97  Although the 
CAO provides increased accountability, it fails to provide a real, 
effective remedy.98 For instance, some claimants are not given 
opportunities to rebut arguments advanced by IFC management.99  
Additionally, the CAO is not definitively independent because IFC 
senior management holds final decision-making powers.100  Critically, 
the CAO’s finding and recommendations are non-binding; therefore, 
the IFC is free to follow its own path.101 
Many organizations’ accountability mechanisms suffer from 
various defects including lack of transparency, lack of democratic 
processes, and overall inadequacy; therefore, the public largely refuses 
to believe that international organizations are accountable.102  Professor 
Daniel Bradlow, a leading scholar of international organization 
accountability, posits that international organizations “use the doctrine 
of international-organization immunity—originally intended to be a 
shield to protect it from interference from member states—as a sword 
for warding off the claims of those who are adversely affected by its 
actions.”103  Professor Bradlow is far from the only voice seeking to fix 
this issue. 
D.  Calls for Change 
Numerous international law scholars have advanced options for 
improving international organization accountability.  Eisuke Suzuki 
and Suresh Nanwani propose that claims should proceed directly to the 
organization’s administrative tribunal, which generally hears contract 
 
97. Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International 
Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development 
Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 181 (2005). 
98. Bradlow Brief, supra note 85, at 22-23.  
99. Id. at 23. 
100. Id.  
101. Id.  
102. Herz, supra note 49, at 483.  
103. Bradlow Brief, supra note 85, at 24. 
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and employment claims.104  Gerhard Thallinger proposes that domestic 
courts should deny the organization’s immunity if the court determines 
the organization has failed to provide adequate quasi-judicial remedies 
or access to an administrative tribunal.105  Dana Clark proposes that 
accountability mechanisms should focus more on problem-solving and 
providing real, effective relief, rather than on investigating the projects’ 
compliance with organizational policies.106  Enrique R. Carrasco and 
Alison K. Guerney propose the creation of an Office of Claims 
Resolution which would initially handle claims and potentially refer the 
claims to an arbitration panel empowered to award damages.107  Finally, 
Professor Bradlow proposes numerous methods and frameworks for 
potential reforms of accountability mechanisms.108 
The above proposals offer excellent options for increasing 
accountability; however, they do not ensure binding, remedial measures 
for injured non-state actors.  Critically, none of the proposals mandate 
U.S. legislative involvement, which is likely necessary for a 
meaningful, systemic improvement of international organizational 
accountability.109  This Comment’s proposal is modeled after the 
successful Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, which involved 
legislation requiring funds be made available for payment of future 
claims. 
 
104. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 97, at 224 & n.212.  
105. Gerhard Thallinger, Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity: The Possible Role 
of Domestic Courts in Enhancing World Bank Accountability, 2 VIENNA ONLINE J. ON 
INT’L CONST. L. 4, 30 (2008). 
106. Dana L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater 
Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 224-26 (2002). 
107. Enrique R. Carrasco & Alison K. Guernsey, World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel: Promoting True Accountability through Arbitration, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
577, 616-18 (2008). 
108. See generally Bradlow, supra note 10, at 462-86 (proposing reforms 
including an inspection committee, a full-time inspection panel, and a “virtual” 
inspection panel).  
109. According to the IFC’s latest financial statements, the United States 
contributes twenty-two percent of the organization’s capital stock, more than any 
other country. INT’L FIN. CORP., FINANCIALS 2019 59 (2019), 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corpora
te_Site/Annual+Report/Financials/Financial-Reporting/.  
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IV.  THE TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
A.  History of Tobacco Litigation and the MSA 
From the 1950s to the 1990s, various plaintiffs tried, largely 
unsuccessfully, to initiate litigation against tobacco companies.110  
Although tobacco companies enjoyed no immunity from suit, lawsuits 
were doomed for two primary reasons.  First, at the time, plaintiffs 
lacked sufficient scientific evidence linking smoking with various 
diseases.111  Later, even once scientific evidence proved a sufficient 
causal link, juries were unsympathetic to plaintiffs that well understood 
the inherent dangers of smoking.112 
Starting in the mid-1990s, parties to class action lawsuits and 
medical care recovery suits successfully reached settlements with 
various tobacco companies.113  Specifically, lawsuits filed by State 
Attorneys General had unprecedented success, seeking recovery for 
medical costs.114  In 1997, the states enjoyed a banner year for tobacco 
lawsuit settlements with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota 
each settling cases for between three and fifteen billion dollars.115  
Class action lawsuits were even a greater success, as exemplified by a 
class of 500,000 Florida smokers that was awarded $145 billion in 
punitive damages.116 
In 1998, forty-six states entered into the MSA with the four largest 
tobacco manufacturers requiring a $206 billion payout over twenty-five 
years.117  The MSA divided tobacco companies into three distinct 
groups: (1) the Original Participating Manufacturers (OPMs), which 
included the original parties to the MSA; (2) the Subsequent 
Participating Manufacturers (SPMs), which included any tobacco 
companies later signing the MSA; and (3) Non-Participating 
 
110. Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 163.  
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 164.  
113. Id. at 164-65. 
114. Id. at 165. 
115. Id. at 166. 
116. Id. at 167. One reason for such a high reward was that the “jury cited the 
industry’s blatant fraud and misrepresentation as the basis for liability.” Id. 
117. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, 481 F.3d at 63. 
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Manufacturers (NPMs), which included other tobacco manufactures 
not party to the MSA.118 
B.  Establishment of Escrow Statutes 
Critically, most NPMs were not in the U.S. market when the MSA 
was signed; therefore, the NPMs would not be subject to U.S. federal 
court jurisdiction until they conducted business in the United States.119  
To prohibit NPMs from receiving a competitive advantage due to the 
settlement costs imputed to OPMs and SPMs, the MSA required that 
states pass statutes (Escrow Statutes) compelling NPMs to deposit 
funds in escrow as security for future lawsuits.120 
The MSA included an example of an Escrow Statute that each state 
must enact.121  The Escrow Statute required NPMs to deposit funds 
relative to cigarettes sold within each respective state.122  NPMs were 
allowed to retain and invest interest earned on the escrow funds into 
extremely safe investments.123  Finally, the NPMs could withdraw any 
funds in excess of minimum escrow requirements as defined in the 
MSA.124 
C.  Learning from the Success of the MSA 
Although scholars frequently highlight several shortfalls of the 
MSA,125 the agreement marked significant success in litigation against 
tobacco companies.  Many institutional factors contributed to 
 
118. Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 170-71. This Comment will not focus 
on OPMs or SPMs. 
119. Id. at 171.  
120. Id.  
121. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, 
EXHIBIT T (Nov. 1998), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/1msa.pdf [hereinafter MSA].   
122. Id. For example, beginning in 2007 and each year after, tobacco companies 
were to deposit into escrow “$.0188482 per unit sold after the date of enactment of 
this Act.” Id. 
123. Id. (“A tobacco product manufacturer that places funds into escrow . . . 
shall receive the interest or other appreciation on such funds as earned.”). 
124. Id.  
125. See generally Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 223-26 (discussing six 
major shortfalls of the MSA). 
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previously unsuccessful litigation, including the overwhelming 
influence held by large tobacco companies and their deep pockets.126  
The MSA provided effective relief to the injured parties and provided 
governments with billions of dollars in funding for various state 
programs, including healthcare and education.127 
Instead of merely improving pre-existing features of various 
internal accountability mechanisms, as proposed by numerous scholars, 
this Comment proposes a wholesale shift in accountability.  Although 
immunity is a critical component of international organization 
effectiveness, the fact remains that injured non-state actors are left 
without a real, effective remedy for their meritorious claims.  
Vulnerable individuals such as Budah cannot afford to be left out in the 
rain. 
A key as to why the MSA might be an effective way to address the 
accountability of international organizations, as it was with tobacco 
companies, lies in the commonality of the power disparity that each 
entity possesses.  Tobacco companies are large, powerful institutions 
with significant advantages over injured individuals.  Similarly, the 
economic and power disparity between massive international 
organizations and claimants from the developing world creates unique 
accountability challenges.  The MSA offered a unique solution to the 
confounding problem of holding tobacco companies accountable.  As a 
result, the international community should consider adopting several 
characteristics of the MSA to improve international organization 
accountability. 
 
126. Tobacco companies used a variety of strategies block regulations around 
the world, including political funding, intelligence gathering, intimidation, and even 
bribery. The 1990s saw a cigarette exportation increase of 260%. Yussuf Saloojee & 
Elif Dagli, Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 78 
BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 902, 902-04 (2000), 
https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78%287%29902.pdf.  
127. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 20, at 215. 
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  
480    CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL     [Vol. 50 
V.  MODELING A REMEDY AFTER THE MSA 
A.  Requirements of International Organizations 
1.  Common Relief Accounts 
As a condition for retaining immunity, each international 
organization should be required to comply with a compensation scheme 
modeled after the MSA.  For every financed development project, the 
organization must deposit a corresponding amount in an escrow-like 
account called a Common Relief Account (CRA).  The funds deposited 
in CRAs will be used to secure payment of future claims.  Organization-
approved algorithms will determine the amount to be deposited into 
CRAs.  The algorithms will incorporate a variety of factors including: 
(a) the riskiness of the project; (b) the scope of potential harm; (c) the 
size of the organization’s operating budget; (d) the organization’s 
history of damage causing projects; and (e) the level of immunity 
afforded to the organization by the laws of the claimant’s jurisdiction. 
As mentioned above, the United States is the largest single 
contributor to many international organizations.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
Congress should amend the IOIA to require establishment of CRAs.  
Otherwise, international organizations will not be sufficiently 
motivated to join this compensation scheme.128  Legislation 
conditioning immunity on establishment of CRAs will hold 
international organizations’ feet to the fire and ensure adequate 
accountability. 
Additionally, just as the MSA allows NPMs to retain and invest 
interest earned on the escrow funds into safe investments, international 
organizations will be allowed to invest CRA funds into certain safe, pre-
approved investments.  International organizations will only be 
permitted to invest certain CRA funds over a minimal threshold, set by 
the above described algorithms.  To ensure CRA funds are properly 
distributed, claims must first be decided by an adjudicative body. 
 
128. See Saper, supra note 11, at 1325 (noting that significant improvements to 
internal accountability mechanisms will require “hard” force, including potential 
action from member states).  
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2.  Claims Tribunal 
Similar to the establishment of CRAs, the U.S. Congress should 
amend the IOIA to require organizations to form an independent, 
neutral, and binding administrative tribunal (Claims Tribunal) that will 
hear claims brought by injured parties.  Unlike the CAO, which has no 
binding authority over the IFC, the Claims Tribunal must be given 
binding authority to direct the release of CRA funds to claimants.  The 
Claims Tribunal will consist of a three-member panel, including 
representatives from various international arbitration companies.  To 
ensure independence, the arbiters must not have any prior connections 
with the organization or its leaders. 
The Claims Tribunal will receive evidence from both parties in an 
open, recorded, and transparent process.  Each proceeding of the Claims 
Tribunal must be videotaped, except for valid security and privacy 
concerns.  Once both sides present their factual evidence, each party 
will have an opportunity for rebuttal.  Once the Claims Tribunal hears 
all testimony and receives all evidence, the tribunal will issue its order 
either directing the release of certain CRA funds or denying the 
complaint.  In the interest of efficiency, all Claims Tribunal orders will 
be final and non-appealable. 
B.  Requirements for Claimants 
1.  Exhaust Domestic Remedies 
CRA funds will not be made available to every claimant seeking 
damages from international organizations.  Qualifying for CRA funds 
should be a difficult, though not impossible, process.  First, claimants 
seeking CRA funds must sufficiently exhaust all available domestic 
remedies against the international organization.129  Requiring claimants 
to exhaust available judicial remedies ensures that this compensation 
scheme does not fracture certain established international norms.130  
Court systems around the world allow for varying degrees of access to 
claimants.  For instance, as discussed above, the U.S. Congress and U.S. 
courts have extended subject matter jurisdiction to claimants if a 
 
129. Domestic remedies will include judicial process in the state where the harm 
was done and the state where the organization is headquartered.  
130. One such norm being immunity. 
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statutory immunity exception applies.  For example, in Budah’s case, 
before qualifying for CRA funds, Budah would be required to exhaust 
all available remedies in both Indian and U.S. courts, in the event that 
either jurisdiction finds a waiver of immunity or a statutory immunity 
exception.  Allowing claimants to access CRA funds without first 
proceeding in their respective domestic jurisdiction would trample on a 
state’s ability to regulate its judicial system. 
2.  Allege Sufficient Damages 
Claimants must allege sufficiently extensive damages for access to 
the Claims Tribunal. For example, monetary damages of $5 million 
dollars may establish requisite harm.131  This restriction allows CRA 
funds to be used for only the most serious claims, usually those that 
affect vast groups of people, like in Budah’s case.  If CRA funds were 
available to every claimant, international organizations would 
effectively be stripped of any immunity.  Additionally, individuals in a 
struggling, developing country could be motivated to pursue frivolous 
claims if aware of potential compensation.  Restricting access to the 
most damaging cases ensures that international organizations retain 
necessary functional immunity, while allowing devastated claimants 
access to critical compensation funds. 
C.  Advantages of the CRA Proposal 
Unlike previous proposals for improving accountability, this 
proposal requires U.S. legislation for the establishment of CRAs and 
Claims Tribunals.  Enacting legislation is a difficult, costly, and 
arduous task; however, the weight behind legislative mandates is 
significant, especially in the field of international organizations.  As 
mentioned above, the United States and its allies jumpstarted the role 
of international organizations following the devastation of the Second 
World War.  Ever since, the United States has positioned itself as a 
world leader with many critical international organizations.  If U.S. 
legislation compelled the funding of CRAs and Claims Tribunals, 
 
131. This minimum damage requirement is used to ensure that international 
organizations are not flooded with numerous minor lawsuits seeking funds from the 
CRA.  
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international organizations around the world would be forced to 
comply. 
Additionally, this proposal provides claimants with access to a real, 
effective remedy for their injuries while, at the same time, allows 
organizations to largely retain the functional immunity necessary to 
carry out their core tasks.  Instead of opening the doors to waves of 
costly, time-consuming litigation, organizations would consider claims 
through their Claims Tribunals.  Given the minimum damage 
requirement, organizations would only be responsible for the most 
devastating injuries. 
D.  Potential Issues 
Although this proposal establishes a mechanism for holding 
international organizations accountable, there might be numerous 
potential issues.  First, the algorithm used to determine the CRA amount 
requirement may not be able to accurately predict eventual harm.  For 
instance, a project could appear relatively safe from a preliminary 
review, only to turn costly, even deadly, in unexpected ways. 
Second, the adjudication of claims may present numerous 
challenges.  Unlike the CAO, which simply reviews the facts and 
determines if the IFC complied with environmental and social 
standards, this proposal requires that international organizations create 
Claims Tribunals to fairly adjudicate claims and determine if access to 
CRA funds is warranted.  However, it remains unclear how the Claims 
Tribunals will handle, among other concerns, evidentiary and legal 
representation issues.  While resolution of these issues is critical to the 
effectiveness of this proposal, specific solutions are best left to an 
international community keen on improving accountability. 
Additionally, it remains unclear to what extent the international 
community will be able to force international organizations to establish 
CRAs and Claims Tribunals.  U.S. legislation might be a significant 
step in improving accountability; however, because international 
organizations are governed by charters and comprised of member states 
from around the world, the United States cannot unilaterally force this 
proposal.  Therefore, any significant change will require charter 
amendments and member states consensus.  Without a doubt, 
establishment of CRAs and Claims Tribunals will increase costs and 
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  
484    CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL     [Vol. 50 
operating budgets of international organizations.  However, the cost 
placed on injured populations will likely outweigh operational costs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
International organizations serve vital interests for the international 
community.  The developing world is forever indebted to the great work 
done by many international organizations.  Additionally, international 
organizations cannot adequately fulfill their missions without some 
level of privileges and immunities.  However, in developing countries, 
the likelihood of harm to vulnerable individuals is increased because 
they lack sufficient resources to mitigate injuries caused by projects 
financed by international organizations.  On the other hand, fortunate 
citizens of the developed world enjoy several institutional safety nets, 
such as insurance, greater mobility, and significantly higher wages, all 
of which prevent injuries from having otherwise catastrophic effects. 
On the other hand, Budah and others in the developing world 
struggle daily to provide their families with basics necessities such as 
food, water, and shelter.  To make matters worse, environmental 
damage frequently exacts harsher injuries on impoverished societies 
whose survival is closely linked to natural resources.  While noble in 
spirit and mission, international organizations should not escape 
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 Claimants like Budah deserve access to a system that will provide 
a fair and independent adjudication of their claims and a real, effective 
remedy for relief.  When injuries are caused by a project funded by the 
deep pockets of an international organization, the organization should 
be held accountable.  This proposal allows international organizations 
to largely retain their necessary immunity while providing claimants 
effective relief when warranted.  Establishing CRAs and Claims 
Tribunals is the first step toward minimizing the accountability gap.  If 
international organizations truly strive to improve the developing 
world, they should remedy their wrongs.132 
Phillip Zunshine* 
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